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Abstract
The paper examines the effects of the degree of competition on the ﬁrms’
decision to innovate in differentiated markets. We ﬁnd that a low (high)
degree of product differentiation (competition) weakly supports the intro-
duction of new products. Firms’ weakly favour a process innovation if the
degree of product differentiation (competition) is high (low). In addition,
assumptions on the strategic complementarity of product and process inno-
vations and on the decreasing returns of a product innovation are found to
be the critical assumptions in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1994).
JEL–Classiﬁcation: L13
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1 Introduction
Every year, the producers of basic fashion items have to decide whether they
want to introduce a new collection, to sell the present one with no or only small
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changes, or to reorganise the production process for the present collection in the
next year. This is an example for a familiar and reoccurring situation which every
chief executive ofﬁcer faces. Basically, it describes a decision problem: Does
it pay for a ﬁrm to pursue a product innovation (new collection), to undertake a
process innovation (reorganisation of production) or to do nothing? Clearly, by
choosing one or the other option, the ﬁrm changes its position and prospectives
over the next years’ competition. It may also be suspected that ﬁrms’ choice
depends on the market structure, i.e. whether or not the competition is intense.
On the one hand, one may argue that ﬁrms try to escape ﬁerce competition by
introducing new, differentiated products. On the other hand, ﬁrms may tend to a
more aggressive strategy and try to reduce costs so that competitors are induced
to exit the market altogether. The present paper is concerned with the question
of whether or not intense competition supports the introduction of new products.
In addition, the paper aims at discovering the critical assumption in the sense of
Milgrom and Roberts (1994).
The interrelation of the market structure of an industry and the R&D invest-
ment or innovations has received much attention over decades.1 Earlier works
were mostly concerned with R&D investments in homogeneous product mar-
kets (for an excellent overview see e.g. Reinganum, 1992). Within this strand
of literature, the effect of the degree of competition on the incentives to innovate
were widely discussed. In his seminal contribution, Schumpeter (1942) argued in
favour of the monopoly while Arrow (1962) established the reverse proposition.
Only recently, this question has been addressed in a framework of a differentiated
product market.2
Most contributions have focused on either a product or a process innovation or
else have left unspeciﬁed which particular type of innovation is studied. However,
1 There are many aspects of market structure. Here, it is used as a synonym for the degree of
competition. Also, (R&D) investments and innovations are used interchangeably.
2 See e.g. Bester and Petrakis (1993) for cost–reducing innovations in a model of horizontal
product differentiation. Among others, Bonanno and Haworth (1998) and Boone (2001) con-
sider process innovations in a model of vertical product differentiation. See e.g. Greenstein
and Ramey (1998), Shaked and Sutton (1990), and Rosenkranz (1995) for models of vertically
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often the ﬁrms have the choice at least between a product and a process innova-
tion. Only a few contributions directed attention to this problem. Among them
are Rosenkranz (1996), Bonanno and Haworth (1998) and Filippini and Martini
(2002). Rosenkranz considers a duopoly in a horizontally differentiated market
with Cournot competition. She demonstrates that ﬁrms will always invest into
product and process innovations and that an increase in the market size shifts
R&D investments towards product innovations.
Bonanno and Haworth rely on a model with vertical product differentiation.
Only one of the duopolists has the chance to innovate and the respective ﬁrm has
to decide between a product and a process innovation. They ﬁnd that the high
(low) quality ﬁrm opts for the product (process) innovation when the competition
is intense (Bertrand competition). The reverse result occurs when the degree of
competition is low (Cournot competition). Filippini and Martini extend the model
of Bonanno and Haworth in that the duopolists simultaneously decide on the in-
novation to be carried out. They ﬁnd two equilibria in which the low and high
quality ﬁrm choose the same type of innovation and one asymmetric equilibrium.
In the latter, the high (low) quality ﬁrm undertakes a product (process) innovation.
In addition, they demonstrate that only the asymmetric case supports a situation
in which the vertical intensity of competition is relaxed.
The present paper studies the innovation problem as a two–stage decision
game. In the initial state there are two ﬁrms each producing a variant of a basic
good. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms simultaneously choose among three alternatives:
a product innovation, a process innovation, or no innovation at all. In the second–
stage they compete in the market. Deliberately, the nature of the product differen-
tiation is left unspeciﬁed, so that the model may apply to a vertical differentiation,
to a horizonal one or a mixture of both. Also, the nature of the second–stage mar-
ket game is not deﬁned, so that the ﬁrms’ strategic variable may be the price as
well as the quantity. Under these circumstances, a product innovation is a change
in the degree of product differentiation and a process innovation is a reduction in
the unit costs of production. We ﬁnd that intense competition, i.e. an initially low
degree of product differentiation weakly, supports the introduction of new prod-
ucts while a low degree of competition weakly promotes process innovations. As
critical assumptions in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) assumptions con-4 Pia Weiß
cerning the strategic complementarity of product and process innovations of a ﬁrm
and the concerning the diminishing returns of a product innovation are identiﬁed.
Hence, the paper offers a conclusive guidline as to the situations under which we
may expect ﬁrms to choose product or process innovations in order to compete
successfully in the near future. As deciding for the product innovation in a highly
competitive environment, the paper also provides an answer to the question under
which circumstances ﬁrms react to ﬁerce competiton with an aggressive strategy.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic framework.
Section 3 describes the properties of the reduced–form proﬁts. In section 4 the
ﬁrms’ innovation decision is studied and the main results are derived. Section 5
investigates the critical assumptions leading to the main results. Two examples
are discussed in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
2 The Framework
Consider a differentiated product market. Deliberately, it is left unspeciﬁed
whether the product differentiation is of a horizontal or vertical nature so that the
model applies models of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. There are
two ﬁrms, i = 1,2, producing different variants of a basic good. Which particular
variant a ﬁrm supplies is considered to be the result of history.
The ﬁrm’s decision problem is modelled as a two–stage, non–cooperative
game. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms simultaneously decide on the type of innovation
they wish to carry out: a product (PI) or process innovation (CI) or no innovation
(NI). In the second stage, after the innovations are completed, the ﬁrms compete
in the market. Their strategic variable may be prices (Bertrand competition) or
quantities (Cournot competition). As usual, the equilibrium concept applied is
that of sub–game perfection.
For expositional reasons and, hence, without loss of generality, it is assumed
that both ﬁrms initially operate with identical and constant unit cost of production
c. There are no ﬁxed costs of production.3 Therefore, producing variant 1 and
2 is equally expensive in the pre–innovation state. Moreover, it is posited that
3 As the considered game is a one-shot one and with strictly positive cost of an innovation (see
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only the initial degree of product differentiation d, d ∈ [0,1], and the scale of the
product innovation affect the ﬁrms’ decision variables.4 The variants are called
a homogeneous product if d = 0, and they are completely independent if d = 1.
Since ﬁrms receive maximal (monopoly) proﬁts when they produce independent
products and obtain minimal ones if there is only one homogeneous good, the
degree of product differentiation is inversely related to the degree of competition.
In absence of any ﬁxed costs, a process innovation is assumed to reduce the
variable costs by a ﬁxed amount g, g∈(0,c). A ﬁrm pursuing a product innovation
supplies a new variant in the second stage and abandons the ’old’ one. By doing
so, the degree of product differentiation is increased by a ﬁxed amount di, di > 0,
where the subscript indicates the initiator of the product innovation, i.e. di = dj,
i, j = 1,2. As the degree of product differentiation is restricted to values from the
interval [0,1], di has to be such that di ∈ (0,(1−d)/2]. Preferably, the scale of
a product and a process innovation should be regarded to be sufﬁciently small.
Each innovation requires a ﬁxed amount of investment costs. For simplicity the
innovation costs I are regarded to be identical for both types of innovation. As the
scale of the innovations may be different, this assumption imposes no restriction
on the generality of the model. In addition, it serves to exclude differences in the
innovation costs as a determinant for or against one type of innovation.
3 The Market Stage
After the ﬁrms learned about the rival’s ﬁrst–stage actions, they compete in the
market. The second–stage decision variables may be prices as well as quantities.
Given the ﬁrms behave rationally, the second–stage reduced form proﬁts are func-
tions of the own costs, the rival’s costs and the degree or product differentiation,
i.e. pi = pi(ci,cj,d), where pi(·) is the ith ﬁrm’s proﬁt net of investment costs.
Rather than specifying the ﬁrm’s demand and cost functions for a particular
4 In non–spatial models of product differentiation this assumption is automatically satisﬁed. Yet,
in spatial models, as e.g. the Hotellings–model, the ﬁrms’ demand function usually depends
also on the ﬁrms’ position on the product line. However, once one considers only symmetric
pre–innovation positions on the product line, the demand function becomes independent of the
initial position.6 Pia Weiß
model and deducing the properties of the appropriate reduced–form proﬁts, it is
posited that the demand and cost functions are such that the reduced form proﬁts
have the following properties:
Assumption 1 (A1). The ﬁrst derivatives of a ﬁrm’s reduced form proﬁts obey:
1. DCipi(ci,cj1,d) ≡ pi(ci2,cj,d)−pi(ci1,cj,d) > 0,
2. DCjpi(ci,cj1,d) ≡ pi(ci,cj2,d)−pi(ci,cj1,d) < 0,
3. pi(ci,cj,d2) ≡ pi(ci,cj,d1)−pi(ci,cj,d2) > 0,
where ci1 > ci2, d1 > d2 and i, j = 1,2.
In accordance with all models of product differentiation, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is the
higher the lower (higher) the own (rival’s) unit costs of production. The last
derivative in A1 shows that the proﬁts are supposed to increase with the degree
of product differentiation. In other words, the proﬁts increase as the degree of
competition becomes smaller.
In addition, the following presumptions are imposed:
Assumption 2 (A2). The second derivatives of the reduced form proﬁts obey:
1. DCipi(·) (DPipi(·)) is monotonically increasing in d (ci),
2. DCipi(·) (DCjpi(·)) is monotonically decreasing in cj (ci),
3. DCjpi(·) (DPipi(·)) is monotonically increasing in d (cj),
4. DPipi(·) is monotonically decreasing in d.
According to A2 (1), a process and a product innovation are strategic com-
plements from ﬁrm i’s perspective. This assumption displays the idea that a ﬁrm
would like to carry out both types of innovation if thy had not to decide for one or
the other. A2 (2) speciﬁes that a reduction in a ﬁrm’s own cost and that of the rival
are are strategic substitutes. Hence, leaving the option of a product innovation
aside, a ﬁrm will try to reduce its costs in response to the competitor’s process in-
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increased the higher the degree of product differentiation. Therefore, the lower the
degree of competition the less cares a ﬁrm about the rival’s efﬁciency.5 Finally,
A2 (4) formalises the idea that the beneﬁts from a product innovation exhibits
decreasing returns.
Clearly, reduced–form proﬁts depend on the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst–stage actions. Con-
sider e.g. the case in which ﬁrm i undertakes a process innovation and it’s rival
neglects either investment option. Given the ﬁrms’ pre–innovation costs, c, are
identical, ﬁrm i’s second–stage technology can be described by c−g. Firm i re-
ceives a net proﬁt of pi(c−g,c,d), while ﬁrm j’s proﬁt is pj(c,c−g,d). Similarly,
pi(c,c,d +dj) marks ﬁrm i’s net payoff, when i declines to innovate and ﬁrm j
supplies a new variant. Then, the functions DPipi(c,c,d) and DCipi(c,c,d) can be
rewritten to
DPipi(c,c,d) = pi(c,c,d+di)−pi(c,c,d), (1)
DCipi(c,c,d) = pi(c−g,c,d)−pi(c,c,d). (2)
DPipi(c,c,d) denotes ﬁrm i’s return on a product innovation, given the rival does
not invest at all. By analogy, DCipi(c,c,d) is ﬁrm i’s incentive for undertaking a
process innovation when the competitor declines to innovate. We ﬁnd the follow-
ing:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption A1, the incentives to introduce a process (product)
innovation is strictly positive, i.e.
DPipi(·) > 0, DCipi(·) > 0, i = 1,2.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of A1.
Independent of the opponent’s ﬁrst–stage action, the incentives to innovate are
always positive.
A necessary condition for a product innovation to be attractive is that the ben-
eﬁts from introducing a new product are higher than the one from implementing a
cost–reducing technology. Let ci(c,c,d) be deﬁned as
(3) ci(c,c,d) ≡ DPipi(c,c,d)−DCipi(c,c,d).
5 For the case of d = 1, i.e. when ﬁrms are monopolies, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function should be inde-
pendent of the opponents costs.8 Pia Weiß
Then, ﬁrm i prefers a product over a process innovation whenever ci(·) is posi-
tive. Here, ci(·) is the relative proﬁtability of a product innovation and has the
following property:
Lemma 2. Under A1 and A2, the relative proﬁtability to introduce a product
innovation decreases in the degree of product differentiation, i.e.
Dci(·,d2) ≡ ci(·,d1)−c(·,d2) < 0, d1 > d2.
Proof. According to A2 (4), dDPipi(c,c,d) ≡ DPipi(c,c,d+dk)−DPipi(c,c,d) < 0, k =
1,2, and A2 (1) implies dDCipi(c,c,d) ≡ DCipi(c,c,d+dk)−DCipi(c,c,d) > 0. Given the
deﬁnition of ci(·) in (3), Dci(·,d2) = dDPipi(·,d2)−dDCipi(·,d2) < 0, with d1 > d2.
The relative attractiveness of a product innovation decreases with the initial
existing degree of product differentiation. This result arises for all possible ﬁrst–
stage actions of the rival. Hence, the relative beneﬁts to carry out a product inno-
vation is larger when the variants are initially close substitutes and the competition
is dense as opposed to the situation where the products are initially nearly inde-
pendent and the degree of competition is low.
The next Lemma describes how a ﬁrm’s incentives to innovate depend on the
rival’s actions.
Lemma 3. Under A1 and A2, the following inequalities hold true:
DCipi(c,c,d+dj) > DCipi(c,c,d) > DCipi(c,c−g,d), (4)
DPipi(c,c−g,d) > DPipi(c,c,d) > DPipi(c,c,d+dj). (5)
Proof. Part (1): According to A2 (1), DCipi(c,c,d +dj) > DCipi(c,c,d). From A2 (2)
follows DCipi(c,c,d) > DCipi(c,c−g,d) > 0. The ﬁrst inequality follows immediately.
Part (2): A2 (3) implies DPipi(c,c−g,d) > DPipi(c,c,d). From A2 (4) we know that
DPipi(c,c,d) > DPipi(c,c,d+dj).
The ﬁrst relation in (4) shows that a ﬁrm’s incentive to implement a cost–
reducing technology is higher when the rival chooses a product innovation instead
of declining to innovate at all. Clearly, a ﬁrm always prefers the competitor to
introduce a new product as an increase in the degree of product differentiation
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and proﬁt — the degree of competition becomes less intense. In addition, ac-
cording to A2 (1), a reduction of the own costs and an increase of the degree of
product differentiation are strategic complements, so that the beneﬁts from a pro-
cess innovation are the higher the more distinct the variants. The second relation
in (4) reveals that the incentive to implement a new technology are higher when
the rival does nothing as compared to a situation in which he adopts a process in-
novation as well. The degree of product differentiation is identical in both cases.
Hence, a ﬁrm always receives a higher return when interacting with a less efﬁcient
competitor.
Similarly, the ﬁrst relation in (5) describes the fact that the incentives to intro-
duce a new product are higher when the competitor undertakes a process innova-
tion instead of declining the innovations. This is a consequence of A2 (3) showing
that a product innovation and an increase in the rival’s costs are strategic substi-
tutes. Hence, by undertaking a product innovation, a ﬁrms counterbalances the
negative effects of the competitor’s cost reduction. Finally, the second relation in
(5) evinces that a ﬁrm’s incentive to carry out a product innovation is higher when
the rival does nothing rather than choosing a product innovation as well. The no-
tation pi(c,c,d+dj) reveals that it is unimportant which ﬁrm initiates the product
innovation for the ﬁrms’ proﬁts net of innovation costs. Only the result matters,
i.e. the increase (decrease) of the degree of product differentiation (competition).
Therefore, the second part of the inequality in (5) reﬂects the assumption of a
product innovation’s diminishing returns. The notation also implies that a ﬁrm
offering a new product always generates a positive external effect.
The next Lemma establishes a comparable connection between the relative
proﬁtability to introduce a product innovation for the different options of the com-
petitor.
Lemma 4. Under A1 and A2, the following holds true:
ci(c,c−g,d) > ci(c,c,d) > ci(c,c,d+dj).
Proof. Given (3), ci(c,c − g,d) − ci(c,c,d) = [DPipi(c,c − g,d) − DPipi(c,c,d)] −
[DCipi(c,c−g,d)−DCipi(c,c,d)]. According to Lemma 3, the ﬁrst bracket term is pos-
itive, while the second one is negative. This proves the ﬁrst part of the inequality. Sim-
ilarly, ci(c,c,d)−ci(c,c,d +dj) = [DPipi(c,c,d)−DPipi(c,c,d +dj)]−[DCipi(c,c,d)−10 Pia Weiß
DCipi(c,c,d +dj)]. Again, from Lemma 3 follows that the ﬁrst bracket term is positive
and the second one negative. This proves the second part of the inequality.
The incentive and the relative attractiveness of introducing a new variant have
identical properties: The relative return on a product innovation is highest when
the rival pursues a process innovation, and lowest when the competitor decides in
favour of a product innovation.
4 The Innovation Decisions
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether to pur-
sue a process or a product innovation or to decline innovations altogether. Given
the ﬁrms behave rationally, they anticipate the second stage actions.
An industry conﬁguration is represented by a tupel indicating the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst–
stage actions. Hence (PI,NI) stands for a situation in which ﬁrm 1 pursues a
product innovation (PI) and ﬁrm 2 does not innovate (NI). By analogy, (CI,CI)
shows that both ﬁrms undertake a process innovation (CI).
Since a ﬁrm has three options, there are nine different industry conﬁgurations:
three symmetric and six asymmetric ones. Due to the symmetry of the game,
we know that (NI,PI) is a Nash equilibrium whenever (PI,NI) proves to be an
equilibrium. Consequently, we need only to consider the follow six potential equi-
libria: (NI,NI), (PI,PI), (CI,CI), (PI,NI), (CI,NI), and (PI,CI).






By analogy, one can establish the other 5 equilibrium conditions.
To establish one of the main results, it is useful to introduce two additional
variables. Let ddi and dgi be deﬁned as ddi ≡ {d ∈ [0,1] : ci(c,c,d +dj) = 0}
and dgi ≡ {d ∈ [0,1] : ci(c,c−g,d) = 0}. Then, ddi (dgi) is the degree of product
differentiation for which ﬁrm i is indifferent between introducing a new productProduct and Process Innovations in Differentiated Markets 11
and a new process given the rival undertakes a product (process) innovation. By
examining the equilibrium conditions closely, the subsequent result ensues.
Proposition 1. Given ddi > 0, dgi < 1 and A1 and A2 are satisﬁed, the following
industry conﬁgurations constitute Nash equilibria:
1. (NI,NI) for I ∈ [max{DPipi(c,c,d),DCipi(c,c,d)},¥),
2. (PI,NI) for I ∈ [max{DPipi(c,c,d +dj),DCipi(c,c,d +dj)},DPipi(c,c,d))
and ci(c,c,d) > 0,
3. (CI,NI) for I ∈ [max{DPipi(c,c − g,d),DCipi(c,c − g,d)},DCipi(c,c,d))
and ci(c,c,d) < 0,
4. (PI,CI) for I ∈ [0,min{DPipi(c,c−g,d),DCipi(c,c,d +dj)}), ci(c,c,d +
dj) < 0 and ci(c,c−g,d) > 0,
5. (PI,PI) for I ∈ [0,DPipi(c,c,d+dj)) and ci(c,c,d+dj) > 0,
6. (CI,ic) for I ∈ [0,DCipi(c,c−g,d)) and ci(c,c−g,d) < 0.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
Figure 1 represents the ﬁrst–stage equilibria in an I/d–diagram. It can be seen
that the number of innovations observed decreases with higher innovation costs I
independent of the degree of product differentiation. Clearly, for very high levels
of the innovation costs, neither ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to innovate at all as the
innovation costs exceed the incentives for the innovations. On the other hand, if
the innovation costs are zero, both ﬁrms will innovate as long as the incentives are
strictly positive. The latter is ensured by Lemma 1. By analogy, we ﬁnd that both
ﬁrms undertake innovations when the innovation costs are low. For intermediate
levels of the innovation costs, only one ﬁrm innovates. The other ﬁrm prefers to
do nothing.
In addition, the following result can be veriﬁed in Figure 1.
Corollary 1. Given ddi ∈ (0,1) and dgi ∈ (0,1) and A1 and A2 are satisﬁed we
ﬁnd that the ﬁrms have a weakly prefer product over process innovations for sim-
ilar products. For distinct products, the ﬁrms weakly favour process to product
innovations.12 Pia Weiß
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Figure 1: The equilibria
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 1.
To reveal the forces leading to Corollary 1, the extreme cases of a homoge-
neous product, d = 0, and the one of completely independent products, d = 1 and
zero innovation costs are considered. Clearly, when products are completely inde-
pendent, the ﬁrms are monopolies and earn the appropriate proﬁt. Introducing a
new product cannot increase the degree of product differentiation and, hence, the
proﬁt. Accordingly, the only measure by which the proﬁts can still be increased
is by trying to produce more efﬁciently, i.e. to undertake a process innovation.
When there is only one homogeneous product, d = 0, the degree of competition
takes its maximum. Together with the assumption that ddi > 0, this implies that to
introduce a new product becomes a dominant strategy independent of the rival’s
choice. Firms beneﬁt less from a process than from a product innovation, they try
to escape competition.
Clearly, the assumptions of ddi > 0 and dgi < 1 play a role. Removing them
leads to the following result:Product and Process Innovations in Differentiated Markets 13
Corollary 2. When ddi < 0 the symmetric industry conﬁguration (2,0) is not an
NE. Similarly, if dgi > 1, the conﬁguration (0,2) fails to be an NE.
Proof. This is also an immediate consequence of Proposition 1 (5) and (6).
This can directly be veriﬁed in Figure 1. According to the deﬁnition of the
variable ddi, ddi < 0 indicates that ﬁrm i prefers a process to a product innovation
even if the good good is homogeneous, given the rival introduces a new product.
Similarly, dgi > 1 signiﬁes that ﬁrm i opts for the new product even if the products
are completely independent, whenever the rival chooses the new process.
Finally, the almost black area in Figure 1 displays combinations of the inno-
vation costs and the degree of product differentiation where multiple equilibria
occur. From Proposition 1 follows that (NI,NI) and (PI,CI) are the industry
conﬁgurations possibly observed.
5 The Robustness of the Results
The main result in Corollary 1 reveals that ﬁrms tend to undertake product
innovationswhenthedegreeofproductdifferentiationislowinordertoescapethe
intense competition. In contrast, ﬁrms are inclined to pursue a process innovation
thereby improving their efﬁciency if the degree of competition is low. The present
section deals with the critical assumption in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts
(1994) leading to the results of Corollary 1.
Inspecting point (4) through (6) of Proposition 1 closely reveals that the prop-
erties of the relative proﬁtability of a product innovation ci(·) determine whether
ﬁrms bend towards a product or process innovation when competition is ﬁerce.
Lemma 2 and 4 state the properties of ci(·) associated with A1 and A2. According
to Lemma 2, ci(·) is negatively correlated to the degree of product differentiation.
In Figure 1 the plus and the minus sign indicate the sign of the appropriate ci(·)
function. From (5) of Proposition 1 it becomes apparent that the results stated in
Corollary 1 are reversed if ci(·) is positively instead of negatively correlated to the
degree of product differentiation. Whether or not ci(·) decreases with d depends
on A2 (2) and A2 (4). Hence, A2 (2) and A2 (4) are the critical assumptions.
More formally, we ﬁnd:14 Pia Weiß
Lemma 5. The relative attractiveness of a product innovation ci(·) obeys
Dci(·,d2) Q 0 ⇐⇒ dDPipi(·,d2) Q dDCipi(·,d2), d1 > d2.
Proof. This follows directly from the deﬁnition of ci(·).
According to the Lemma, similar products support the introduction of new
products whenever a small increase in d has a larger effect on the incentive to
create a new product than on the one to implement a new process. By analogy,
intense competition favours the adoption of cost–reducing technologies when a
small rise in the product differentiation leads to a greater change in the return on a
process innovation as compared to the one on a product innovation. Clearly, when
dDPipi(·) is positive (negative), a product innovation exhibits increasing (decreas-
ing) returns. Similarly, if dDCipi(·) is positive (negative), a cost reduction and a
new product are complements (substitutes) from ﬁrm i’s point of view. Accord-
ingly, the combination of assumptions on the complementarity of CI and PI and
on the diminishing returns of a p determines whether or not ﬁrms tend to introduce
new products when the degree of competition is high. The following Proposition
gives an overview on all possible combinations:
Proposition 2. (a) Corollary 1 holds true whenever
1. PI andCI are complements for ﬁrm i and d exhibits decreasing returns or
2. PI andCI are complements, d exhibits increasing returns and |dDPipi(·)| <
|dDCipi(·)| or
3. PI and CI are substitutes, d exhibits decreasing returns and |dDPipi(·)| >
|dDCipi(·)|.
(b) The results of Corollary 1 are reversed whenever
1. PI andCI are substitutes for ﬁrm i and d exhibits increasing returns or
2. PI andCI are complements, d exhibits increasing returns and |dDPipi(·)| >
|dDCipi(·)| or
3. PI and CI are substitutes, d exhibits decreasing returns and |dDPipi(·)| <
|dDCipi(·)|.Product and Process Innovations in Differentiated Markets 15
Proof. From A2 (1) follows that CI and PI are complements (substitutes) if dDCipi(·) is
positive (negative). By A2 (4), d exhibits decreasing (increasing) returns if dDPipi(·) is
negative (positive).
Part (a): 1. If CI and PI are complements and d exhibits decreasing returns it is true that
dDPipi(·) < 0 < dDCipi(·), so that Dci < 0 by Lemma 5.
2. IfCI and PI are complements and d yields increasing returns 0 < dDPipi(·) < dDCipi(·)
implies Dci(·) < 0 by Lemma 5.
3. If CI and PI are substitutes and d exhibits increasing returns dDPipi(·) < dDCipi(·) < 0
yields Dci(·) < 0 by Lemma 5.
Hence, for cases (1) through (3), Dci(·) is negative. Given the functions ci(·) possess a
zero in (0,1), the conﬁgurations (PI,NI) and (PI,PI) are equilibria for small values of the
degree of product differentiation d by Proposition 1 (2) and (5). In contrast, the conﬁg-
urations (CI,NI) and (CI,CI) will be equilibria for high value of product differentiation
according to Proposition 1 (3) and (6).
Part (b): By analogy, it can be established that Dci(·) is positive for cases (1) through
(3). Given the functions ci(·) possess a zero in (0,1), the conditions on ci(·) stated in
Proposition 1 (2) and (5) are satisﬁed for high values of d so that (PI,NI) and (PI,PI)
are equilibria when the products are distinct. Similarly, the appropriate functions of ci(·)
are negative for small values of d, so that (CI,NI) and (CI,CI) are equilibria for similar
products according to Proposition 1 (3) and (6).
6 Applications
So far, neither the nature of the product differentiation, i.e. horizontal, vertical
or both, nor the one of the product market competition, i.e. Bertrand or Cournot,
has been speciﬁed. In addition, the results have been derived without resting on
a speciﬁc demand function. Consequently, any combination of a speciﬁc demand
function, strategic–second stage variable and nature of product differentiation will
yield the results stated in Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and 2 as long as the reduced–
form proﬁts obey assumptions A1 and 2. Clearly, depending on the precise speci-
ﬁcation of the model, the above results may be valid for certain parameter values
only. We now present two examples, a Bertrand and a Cournot model of non–
spatial product differentiation with linear demand functions, to demonstrate how
these models ﬁt into the analysis presented above.16 Pia Weiß
Assume that the inverse demand functions are given by
(7) pi = a−qi−qqj, i = 1,2,
where q, q ≡ 1−d, is also a measure of the degree of product differentiation.
Then, the corresponding direct demand schedule reads (cf. Vives, 2000, pp. 146)
(8) qi = a−bpi+gpj, i = 1,2,


















where q = 1−d has been used and the superscript C (B) stands for Cournot
(Bertrand).













for the situation in which neither ﬁrm innovates. The lower row shows that a prod-
uctinnovationexhibitsincreasingreturnsunderCournotcompetitionforallvalues
of the degree of product differentiation. According to the ﬁrst row, a product and a
processinnovationaresubstituteswheneverd <1/3, i.e.forverysimilarproducts.
If d ≥ 1/3 a product and a process innovation are strategic complements. Thus,
for d ∈[0,1/3), Cournot competition satisﬁes condition (b)1 of Proposition 2. For
values of the degree of product differentiation in the range of d ∈ [1/3,1], either
condition (a)2 or (b)2 is satisﬁed. Which of the cases proves to be relevant de-
pends on the magnitude of ¶DCipi(c,c,d)/¶d relative to ¶DCipi(c,c,d)/¶d. Per
deﬁnition, both expressions depend on the scale of a process innovation, g, andProduct and Process Innovations in Differentiated Markets 17
a product innovation d. Hence, for suitable restrictions on g and d and all de-
grees of product differentiation, the reverse results of Corollary 1 are applicable
even though a process and a product innovation are not strategic substitutes for all
values of d.












with fc ≡ 2(1−d)4 +3(1−d)(1+d2)+4d2 > 0 and fd ≡ d3 −2d2 +4d −2.
Again, both equations display the situation in which both ﬁrms prefer not to in-
novate. According to the ﬁrst equation, a process and a product innovation are
strategic complements for all values of d under Bertrand competition. However,
a product innovation may exhibit decreasing as well as increasing returns. When
there is only one homogeneous product, i.e. d = 0, the expression in the second
row becomes negative, so that condition (a)1 of Proposition 2 applies. For inde-
pendent products, i.e. d = 1, the derivative become positive, so that a production
innovation yields increasing returns. Despite the possibility of increasing returns
of a product differentiation, the results of Corollary 1 may hold for all values of d
given suitable restrictions on the scale of the process and product differentiation.
The considered examples of a linear demand schedule reveal a slight tendency
for second–stage Cournot competition to support process innovations for similar
products. By analogy we ﬁnd that the second–stage Bertrand competition pro-
motes the product innovation when products are similar. However, for demand
function different from the linear ones, this pattern need not to carry over.
7 Conclusions
In a general framework, we demonstrate that ﬁrms bend towards product in-
novations when the degree of competition is intense and the innovation costs are
low. The rationale behind is simply to escape competition by introducing distinct
products. As the degree of competition decreases, the returns on a product in-
novation decrease as well. As a consequence, ﬁrms favour process innovations18 Pia Weiß
when the degree of competition attains its minimum, i.e. when ﬁrms produce dis-
tinct products. In this situation they are monopolies and introducing an alternative
product cannot increase proﬁts any further. For intermediate levels of competition
and low or intermediate levels of the innovation costs, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms choose
different alternatives. In case of low innovation costs, both ﬁrms innovate but
choose different types.
Theresultsapplyforawidevarietyofmodelsincludingspatialandnon-spatial
product differentiation, Bertrand or Cournot competition and any type of demand
functions. The only restrictions under which the above cited results are obtained
are that the relative proﬁtability of a product innovation is negatively correlated
to the degree of product differentiation. If a particular model yields a positive
correlation between the relative attractiveness of a product innovation and the de-
gree of product differentiation, the results are reversed. The critical assumptions
determining whether or not the relative proﬁtability of a product differentiation
negatively depends on the degree of product differentiation negative have been
identiﬁed as the strategic complementarity of product and process innovations for
a ﬁrm and the diminishing returns of a product innovation.
It would be desirable to generalise the results several respects. On the one
hand, the analysis postulated that innovations are carried out under perfect cer-
tainty. This assumption may be justiﬁed if the ﬁrm buys the innovation from a
third party rather engaging an own research department. However, even in this
case there may be a certain amount of uncertainty left. In this respect, the derived
results may serve as a benchmark case. On the other hand, we considered a sit-
uation in which the new product replaces the old one. Clearly, the above cited
example of the fashion industry satisﬁes this requirement. Nevertheless, there are
numerous instances in which a new product is added. We can buy a Walkman, a
portable CD–player or a portable MD–player although all of them serve the same
basic function and the last one is much younger than the previous two products.Product and Process Innovations in Differentiated Markets 19
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The conditions listed in parts 1 through 6 are the conditions for a Nash equi-
librium (NE), where the incentive notation has been employed rather than the
original one using the proﬁt functions. Hence, to prove Proposition 1, it sufﬁces
to report the equilibrium conditions.
Part 1: (0,0) is an NE if (1) I ≥ DCipi(c,c,d) and (2) I ≥ DPipi(c,c,d).
Part 2: (1,0) is an NE if (1) ci(c,c,d) ≥ 0, (2) I < DPipi(c,c,d), (3) I ≥
DCipi(c,c,d+dj), (4) I ≥ DPipi(c,c,d+dj).
Part 3: (0,1) is an NE if (1) ci(c,c,d) < 0, (2) I < DCipi(c,c,d), (3) I ≥
DCipi(c,c−g,d), (4) I ≥ DPipi(c,c−g,d).
Part 4: (1,1) is an NE if (1) ci(c,c−g,d) ≥ 0, (2) I < DCipi(c,c−g,d), (3)
ci(c,c,d+dj) < 0, (4) I < DPipi(c,c,d+dj).
Part 5: (2,0) is an NE if (1) ci(c,c,d+dj) ≥ 0, (2) I < DPipi(c,c,d+dj).
Part 6: (0,2) is an NE if (1) ci(c,c−g) < 0, (2) I < DCipi(c,c−g,d).
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